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ABSTRACT 
This thesis was a feasibility study of Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) method 
usage in customer feedback in SW development environment. In 
particular the version MSG-3 (contemporary version for aviation) or 
RCM II (contemporary version for power plants design) was used as 
reference method.  
In customer interface of Nokia Devices there is a data base system used for customer 
feedback and analysis. The system meets very well its purposes, but it 
is not adopted for FMEA analysis. In Maintenance for Aviation 
course MSG-3 method was introduced. Because of it MSG-3 (RCM 
II) was taken as reference FMEA analysis method to this thesis. 
The basic method was to run trough a RCM II style analysis for customer feedback 
report template and to analyze, how the existing data base could be 
modified to create RCM II style reports and analysis. For existing 
data base also CSA analysis was made in order to understand, if there 
is gaps vs. RCM II requirements and what kind of gaps there is (if 
any). mySQL language was used to describe basic data base structure 
of a RCM II compliant data base. 
This thesis showed, that it is possible to calculate MTBF for SW in higher level even it 
is not possible in SW function level. RCM II approach had to be used 
in order to understand how deep functionality split can to be done, 
but still not losing possibility to calculate MTBF. 
This thesis is good guide to persons unfamiliar to RCM and its history. This thesis also 
explains the basic requirements for data base design, if RCM 
compliant data base should be created.Most importantly silent 
information in customer interface becomes public domain 
Analysis of customer has been already done with one application for a single industry 
partner feedback. This will be extended to other applications for this 
customer. If it is decided to implement RCM II style analysis to all 
customer feedback, the current data base should be modified 
accordingly. Also training material should be created and sessions 
should be arranged.  
Keywords Final thesis, RCM, MSG-3, CSA, customer relations 
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List of abbreviations 
API Application Programming Interface 
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DT Down time 
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F(M)E(C)A Failure (Mode,) Effect (and Criticality) Analysis 
MSI Maintenance Significant Item, maintenance task 
MSG-3 Maintenance Steering Group revision 3 (RMC for Aviation) 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
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SW Software 
TBF Time Between Failures 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TTF Time To Fix 
TTV Time To Verify 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
UT Up Time 
WAS Works As Specified 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis is inspired by the most common misconception about SW development, 
which is described in following phrase: 
“If it is fixed once, it will fail never again” (unknown SW developer 
2008) 
This misconception will end up to the conclusion, that if a failure can be fixed for good 
every time it is detected, it can not be failed again. Thus statistical measurements, such 
as Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), can not effectively be measured to the SW. In 
a source code level that applies very well, but if you consider the same problem in 
higher level, the truth can be totally different.  
The SW module or component can be failing by multiple reasons. The failure could for 
example be related to missing component or missing upgrade of a component. Or the 
failure could occur due some interference from other SW component or module 
communicating with the SW component or module demonstrating ill behavior. What 
the end user then sees is a missing, limited or otherwise bad functionality of a device or 
application, albeit the reason for this failure will usually remain ambiguous. Even to the 
organization creating the product it is often hard to find out the real root cause to the 
failure without proper analysis methods. In world of maintenance similar need of 
analysis tools evolved to Reliability Centered Maintenance approach described by John 
Moubray in his book (John Moubray 1997). 
Nokia customer interface team is responsible of handling customer feedback during 
product development phase. In the past there has been some focused analysis for certain 
purposes in the team; most notably Works As Specified (WAS) reports reduction and 
Evidence Based Acceptance (EBA) exercises last year. Even the root causes were found 
and the main target of reducing amount of customer feedback the main problem of those 
analyses were, that those were not conducted in a systematic manner. The only re-
usable part of the end reports of those analyses are the root causes for failures of certain 
test cases. The relation between the reason for the failure (e.g. root cause) and the 
circumstance (e.g. failure mode) the failure happened was not defined on those. The 
business impact or other effect of the failure was not defined, either. In RCM process all 
of these will be defined. Therefore, as the end result of analysis, RCM gives the list of 
root causes of the failures having the most business critical impact. As customer 
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interface team is a part of customer interface, its operation is strongly driven by the 
factor of business impact a tool such as RCM would greatly help to focus resources in 
the most economically feasible way. And that kind of tool this team has been lacking. 
The target of this thesis is to evaluate how RCM process could be utilized in SW 
development environment. In order to achieve this customer program has to be 
subjected to product development methods. In the scope of this thesis customer program 
is considered to be equipment having different kind of modules and entities performing 
certain functionalities. Each of the customer reports will be considered as failure of 
customer program to achieve adequate performance. 
Out of the scope of this final thesis the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA-
analysis) will be done for customer feedback of single industry partner and to a single 
application and five products in a same product family. Further outlining of source data 
has been done to select the customer reports related to the main testing tool they are 
using for this feature, as those customer reports have real unified test case behind those. 
This amount of data to be analyzed is statistically valid, but not too large for final thesis 
purposes. There are some references to the test results in this thesis, but detailed results 
are not revealed due confidentiality reasons. 
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2 Reliability Centered Maintenance 
RCM is related to Total Quality Management (TQM) approach, but due holistic 
approach to quality, TQM is not giving specific instructions how to implement quality 
management in a specific task. TQM is also concentrating of quality management in 
organizational or process level, not in engineering or product development level. 
However, the core idea of TQM, quality management being continuous process, is very 
well adopted in RCM:  
This emphasis on what the asset does rather than what it provides a 
whole new way of defining the objectives of maintenance for any asset 
– one of which focuses on what the user wants. This is the most 
important single feature of RCM process, and is why many people 
regard RCM as ‘TQM applied to physical assets’. (Moubray 1997, p. 
21)
Contemporary RCM methods are optimized to be used on maintenance of complex 
systems such as power plants (RCM II). MSG-3 is de facto RCM standard of managing 
maintenance in aircraft industry. 
2.1 History of Reliability Centered Maintenance 
Until the late 1950 Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), US government’s regulatory office 
for airline maintenance had been more and more concerned on failure rates on certain 
engine types. In order to solve these reliability problems, it established FAA/Industry 
Reliability Program. Term Reliability-centered maintenance was mentioned first time 
was introduced in the report made by Nowlan and Heap. The first versions of the 
decision making diagrams were published in 1968. (Järviö 2004, 2-4). 
In late 70’s United Airlines was required to report how it will develop its maintenance 
program. That program was funded by US Department of Defense (DoD) and the end 
report was called “Reliability-centered Maintenance” (Nowlan, Stanley, Heap, 1978). 
Contemporarily MSG-1 had evolved to more sophisticated MSG-2. MSG-2 still had 
bottom-up approach for analysis, but adoption of RCM approach turned the FEA 
analysis process to top-down approach in MSG-3. MSG-2 is still applied to 
maintenance of military and civil aircrafts such as L-1011 and DC-10. (Friend 1992, 48-
50), (NAVAIR 1998, 13-15). 
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Until the 1980’s US aviation industry and military had been the main drivers to 
reliability centered approach in the maintenance. But the interest of TQM and RCM 
ideology especially in mining and manufacturing sectors, led application of RCM 
process in maintenance departments of companies in the other industry sectors. That led 
of creation of RCM II. Today SAE JA1011 defines the minimum requirements for 
RCM process and also US military is nowadays following the SAE JA1011 basic 
principles in it’s internal requirements such as NAVAIR 00-25-403 (Revision 1). 
(Moubray 1997, 321-326) 
As RCM and MSG are nowadays in process mind the same, further on in this thesis 
RCM refers to RCM II / MSG-3. 
History of RCM and related specifications is described in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: History of Reliability Centered Maintenance 
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2.2 Functions 
In RCM methodology function is described as state, where system or component is 
working within its design limits. In SW development environment running a test case 
with positive (passed) verdict can be considered as such function. Customer interface is 
working within its design limits, when there is no customer incidence reports inflow – 
or it is minimal.  Figure 2 shows a template of RCM compliant incidence report in data 
base system. 
Figure 2: Template of a customer incidence report. 
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2.3 Functional Failures 
In RCM functional failure is described as a state, when a function is not operating 
within its design limits. Thus also outperforming specified performance level would be 
a failure, which is traditionally seen as asset, not deficiency. Analogy to customer 
reporting for incident report with outperforming the specification limits would be a 
situation, where a test case is passed even verdict should be failed. 
In the first analysis done to real data using this thesis as basis the functional failures had 
following categories (N=550): 
x Test Case can not be run (~1%) 
x Test Case can be partially run (~1%) 
x Test Case is passed partially 
x Test Case is not passed (~98%) 
x Test Case passed, but should fail 
See Appendix I for hypothetical examples of the functional failures. Percentages above 
describe hit rates for different failure categories identified for the incidence reports after 
FMEA analysis was done to real data. 
2.4 Failure effects 
Each of functional failure should have an incident report created for it. In RCM the 
incidence report is considered always as implication of functional failure of the system 
that is under RCM analysis. Thus, when RCM principles are implemented in customer 
interface, each customer incidence report is considered as implication of functional 
failure for customer interface team. If no product specific functional failure is found 
during FMEA, the failure effect is to communicate customer about it. In RCM 
perspective main target of the customer interface team should be minimizing the inflow 
of incidence reports, as those have always economical impact to the company. This idea 
is the most important hypothesis on this thesis.  
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The list of failure effects categories created during this thesis work for FMEA analysis 
are: 
x Communication (least severe) 
x Test Case redesign 
x SW Configuration 
x SW Integration 
x SW Redesign 
x Sales blocking 
x Safety (most severe) 
Single report can have multiple failure effects. For example SW needs redesign and that 
has to be communicated to the customer. Failure effect is explained in detail in 
maintenance task. Maintenance tasks and failure effect selection are described in 
Chapter 2.7. 
2.5 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
2.5.1 System 
SW is usually described with ISO/OSI model that consists of seven vertical layers. In 
the Figure 3, a theoretical module is illustrated. In this model there is three applications 
two of which have access to the same transport layer (e.g. TCP), and third to other one 
(e.g. UDP). Communication between layers is created by Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs). Within each independent layer module there can be many sub 
functions, each of which has several APIs. 
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Figure 3: ISO/OSI model 
Each application usually has dedicated specialists coding those, which makes it more 
feasible to make FMEA study to each application separately. Also product level test 
cases are usually structured so, that division is done according applications and sub 
functionalities of those (see Figure 4). So all of this supports starting functionality split 
in vertical scope in stead of horizontally in ISO/OSI model. 
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Application
Area
Area
Functionality group
Functionality group
Function
Function
Applications are divided to 
multitude of functionalities, 
that can be divided to 
subsets – functionality 
areas.
Functionality area test 
coverage is achieved by 
designing and running test 
case super group. These 
test cases usually does 
not overlap over different 
areas.
The super groups have 
lower level functionality 
groups, which also can be 
tested by subset of test 
cases.
Ultimately each function 
can be tested with a test 
case.
Figure 4: Application functionalities and test cases. 
SW function should not be considered as function understood in RCM. SW function can 
have multiple independent functions. SW function has inputs, atomic code and non-
atomic code, which comprises of multiple functions (see Figure 5). Each of which 
should be tested separately. Naturally the customer feedback is not in SW function 
level, but it is generated by test results on the customer’s test case set. However, when 
code level analysis it should be understood which kind of functions are in the code 
under analysis and how to design proper test coverage of these functions. Code level 
analysis will be done by R&D. 
Figure 5: SW function vs. RCM functions 
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2.5.2 Analysis 
FMEA analysis should always be done by competent body. In case of customer 
incidence reports, the main responsibility of running FMEA analysis will be on the 
customer interface organization assigned for the task. This activity will be supported by 
the stake holders in R&D and customer. 
Figure 6 illustrates, what initial approach to functions, functional failures and failure 
modes was taken in this thesis. As this was the 1st time RCM style approach was taken 
to the customer incidence reports, the idea was to collect as many as possible 
combinations there is available. That means of collecting also (seemingly) impossible 
choices to each category. As the end result of the first analysis work done using this 
thesis Failure category 5 (see Figure 6) was excluded as it should never occur in 
customer feedback. Also some second level Failure Modes could be combined during 
these iteration rounds for that data. 
Function Failures Failure Modes
Test Case run 1 Test Case can not be run A Server 1 Configuration
2 Test Case can be partially run 2 Malfunction
3 Test Case is passed paritally 3 Funtionality Interference
4 Test Case is not passed B Test Case 1 Test Case Direct Flaw
5 Test Case passed, but should fail 2 Test Case Content Not Supported
3 Test Case Instruction Not OK
4 Test Case Indirect Flaw
C Human 1 Test Setup
2 Test Case Instruction Not Understood
3 Device Capabilities Not Understood
4 Device Capabilities Not Available (early SW)
5 Wrong Specification Used
6 Wrong Test Case Verdict
D Integration 1 Component Missing - Variant
2 Component Fail - Variant
3 Component Configuration - Variant
4 Component Upgrade not done - Variant
5 Component Missing - Core
6 Component Fail - Core
7 Component Upgrade not done - Core
8 Component Configuration - Core
E Support 1 Deprechiated feature
2 Higher or adjasent module feature
3 New feature request (not suppored)
4 Partial support only
Figure 6: Initial functions, functional failures and failure modes. 
In addition to Figure 6, the analysis is feasible to be started from test case one to the last 
test case. And for each incidence report third level Failure Mode has to be defined.  For 
the third level Failure Mode, it has to be checked, if it is existing failure mode or new 
failure mode for the test case incidence report was reported to. This level of detail is 
still effective, but not too detailed for customer feedback in SW development 
environment. But in some other implementations even more detailed failure mode 
division may be needed. See Appendix I for example of Failure Modes. After defining 
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failure mode and failure effect for each incidence report, the failure consequence has to 
be defined. That is described in next chapter. 
The end result of a FMEA analysis of a customer incidence report is root cause for that 
report. If the root cause is in platform SW level the root cause combining can – and 
should be – done for those root causes also across different applications. 
2.6 Failure Consequences 
In RCM failure consequences are categorized by four variables: 
x Perceptivity (hidden/detectable) 
x Safety 
x Operational 
x Economical 
The MSI (Maintenance Significant Item) type – or Failure Consequence category - is 
selected by logic described in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: RCM logic tree 
In RCM the fixing priority for the MSIs across to the MSI categories is 
x Hidden Safety 
x Detectable Safety 
x Detectable Operation 
x Hidden Economical 
x Detectable Economical 
In customer interface, if there is no other impact from an incidence report, there is time 
and money spent for analyzing it. In such situation the failure consequence for that 
incidence report would be detectable economical.
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2.7 Maintenance Tasks 
Each failure mode identified by FMEA analysis should have at least one maintenance 
task (or maintenance significant item, MSI) defined to it. According to RCM definitions 
the maintenance task should always be both effective and economically feasible to be 
implemented. Good customer service requires response to the customer, so there can not 
be total exclusion of all maintenance tasks for a root cause, which is allowed in for 
example in MSG-3 used in aviation industry. Therefore at least communication task 
will always be defined for every root cause.
In case of customer interface incidence reports effective maintenance task should 
include at least: 
x Root cause description 
x List of the test cases (functions) failing because of the same root cause 
x Estimated time to have the root cause fixed, if the functions (test cases) should 
be supported according the design specification of the product 
x Inform customer, what is required from it if it wants the root cause preventing 
functions to be fixed (test cases to pass), if the design specification of the 
product indicates, that this function is not supported by it 
x External reason(s), why functional failure occurs, if such is known. This kind of 
failure could be for example coding error in the test case. 
See Appendix II for example of maintenance task list containing MSIs. 
After effective maintenance task(s) have been defined, economical feasibility could 
limit the implementation for more severe maintenance tasks, than a communication 
tasks. Figure 8 describes that selection procedure. For each root cause either a 
communication task or a higher level maintenance task complemented with a 
communication maintenance task will be created.  
21 (43) 
Figure 8: Maintenance task class (failure effect category) selection 
Redesign is always effective task, but it may not be economically feasible. That kind of 
situation can occur for example: 
x If the redesign requirement would impose large amount of coding effort and 
testing requirements to the SW and the functional benefits of those changes 
would be minimal. 
x If the redesign requirement imposed to a SW in end of its life cycle and major 
changes to the code would be needed. 
In these cases the maintenance task would be communication to the customer that the 
SW would need redesigned, but it would not be economically feasible to redesign that 
feature.  
Safety related and sales blocking (S&S in Figure 8) tasks are always considered as 
economically feasible. After analysis has been done it might be, that these tasks can be 
configuration, integration or configuration tasks for R&D, but for customer interface 
those are still sales blocking or safety related tasks. 
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2.7.1 Maintenance Task scheduling 
In aviation industry maintenance tasks are scheduled by MTBF, failure consequence
and failure effect. MTBF is taken into account, as mechanical wearing of a system, 
module or component can be depended by flight hours or number of flights. The 
schedule could be defined for example with following intervals: 
x A Check, 500 flight hours 
x B Check, 3 months 
x C Check 12 months 
x D Check 4-5 years 
In customer interface maintenance task scheduling can be made for example in 
following way: 
x A Check 
o Every SW delivery to customer 
x B Check 
o Every product sales SW delivery to customer 
x C Check 
o Customer testing start for a new product 
x D Check 
o Platform SW redesign delivery to customer testing 
Changes to 
previous product 
SW.
Known test case 
redesign 
communication.
Configuration status 
communication.
New customer 
integration 
requirements 
harvesting
New configuration 
requirements 
harvesting.
Known customer 
configuration 
requirements 
verification.
Test case redesign 
requirements 
harvesting.
Test case redesign 
verification.
Communication IntegrationConfigurationTest Case Redesign
New customer 
requirements 
harvesting
A Check
Communication of 
implemented 
(customer 
verification needed) 
or verified fixes.
Customer 
integration fix 
verification
Major impact 
customer 
configuration fix  
verification
Minor impact 
customer redesign 
verificationB Check
Maintenance task 
list report (see 
chapter 2.7.2)
Major impact 
customer integration 
fix verification.
Maintenance task 
list report (see 
chapter 2.7.2)
Maintenance task 
list report (see 
chapter 2.7.2)
Maintenance task 
list report (see 
chapter 2.7.2)
Maintenance task 
list report (see 
chapter 2.7.2)
Customer redesign 
verification.
C Check
Major impact 
customer redesign 
verification
D Check
New sales blocking 
reports harvesting
Sales Safety
New safety related 
reports harvesting
Sales blocking fix 
verification
Safety related fix 
verification
Maintenance task 
list report (see 
chapter 2.7.2)
Maintenance task 
list report (see 
chapter 2.7.2)
Figure 9: Maintenance task scheduling 
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2.7.2 Maintenance task list report for known root causes 
Customer interface’s main task is to minimize incidence report amount. Thus 
maintenance task list for known root causes should be created. This kind of document 
should be organized so, that it has maximum impact on reduction of the amount of 
incidence reports. This chapter describes basic structure of this document and Appendix 
II is an example template of it.  
First it is good to list known functional changes (redesigns, fixes and depreciated 
features) in upcoming version of this part of product SW. This should eliminate 
incidence reports that would be created because customer is not aware of changes, when 
new version is deployed. 
Then the tasks are organized in following order: 
x root causes, which failure effect  is safety related or are sales blocking
o Note: this chapter is omitted from Appendix II 
x If MTBF is collected for root causes, root causes with frequent MTBF interval 
and that have failure effect(s) higher than communication 
o threshold frequency for root causes on this category should be defined 
 for example MTBF <30 days 
 or MTBF = 0; every SW sent to testing has this root cause 
reported on it  because a test case has/had a flaw 
o this may be feasible for configuration or integration class tasks 
o Note: this chapter is omitted from Appendix II 
x the rest of root causes
o Highest level sorting of root causes by failure effect from 
Communication tasks to Redesign tasks (ascending) 
 Second level sorting of root causes by failure consequence from 
Detectable Operational to Detectable Economical (descending) 
x Third level sorting of root causes by number of incidence 
reports (descending) 
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3 CSA of RCM Process Implementation to customer 
feedback
This chapter focuses on the changes needed to current reporting system, if RCM 
methods would be implemented in the database used by customer interface team. 
Appendix I has examples of each part of data base structure described in this chapter.  
In the information transfer wise customer’s data base is in upstream and program data 
base is in down stream. In middle of those is the database used by customer interface 
group. As the RCM analysis should be done by customer interface, the R&D system 
does not need changes for RCM purposes. If the RCM type analysis would be 
implemented in R&D system, the below CSA analysis should be done also to it.  
Customer Interface
CUSTOMER
R&D
Figure 10: Customer interface dataflow 
Connection between customer data base and customer interface data base can be real 
data base connection or manual transfer. For simplicity reasons further chapters it is 
assumed to be real connection. If there is no real data base connection to customer’s 
incidence report data base, in next chapters “customer” is referring to person 
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responsible to transfer customer feedback (contact by e-mail, telephone, spread sheet or 
word processor document) manually to customer interface data base. 
3.1 Issue 
3.1.1 Current state: Issue 
Customer 
x Data delivered to customer interface data base consists: product and product 
SW, sequential issue number for the customer, issue description in plain text 
format, criticality level of the issue for the customer.  
x Customer can redefine incidence report status between various open/inspection 
on-going or closed/investigation stopped statuses.  
customer interface 
x customer interface system amends the incidence report with information about 
issue criticality level for customer interface. 
x customer interface can define new (internal) incidence report status and that 
status is updated to the customer data base. 
x There is possibility to transfer incidence report to R&D for further inspection.  
x All of issue data can be transferred to the analysis tool. 
3.1.2 Change Requirements: Issue 
Customer 
x Currently the level the incidence reports are delivered by the customer is 
sufficient - assuming that the incidence report itself contains needed 
information. Thus no modification is needed for RCM purposes. 
customer interface 
x No changes are needed for RCM purposes.  
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3.2 Test Case 
3.2.1 Current state: Test Case 
Customer 
x The test case identification is not automatically implemented. Usually that 
information is embedded either in the title of the incidence report or in the body 
of it, but there is no fixed manner enforced, how it is delivered to supplier 
(customer interface system). Thus this information may be also missing from the 
incidence report. 
x Test case description quality varies. It could also include link to customer test 
server. The customer server could be accessible by supplier or not. In latter case 
joint test session may be needed before passing the issue to R&D system. 
customer interface 
x customer interface has to request test case related information from the customer 
in order to be able to process the issue. For high priority reports the issue has 
sometimes to be forwarded to R&D before that is done. 
x Issue title is separate data item that can be transferred to the analysis tool. 
3.2.2 Change Requirements: Test Case 
Customer 
x Unique customer test case identification should be always available in each 
incidence report. Preferably in separate field, for example unique and uniform 
title is enough for this purpose.  
customer interface 
x Test case identification is very vital for RCM level MTBF calculation. Unique 
uniform title is enough for this purpose. This item should be transferrable to the 
analysis tool. 
x customer interface should not accept incidence report, if it does not include test 
case identification and clear description how the test case can be run. 
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3.3 MTBF 
3.3.1 Current state: MTBF 
Customer 
x Customer delivers information about issue detection time, SW version and 
product. Customer also reports, when the issue has been solved.  
x Customer may reopen report, if there is new fail in the test case.  
x Each state change is time-stamped. 
customer interface 
x The report status can be changed by customer interface. Each state change is 
time-stamped.  
x customer interface team can communicate fix availability in comment field. 
x Time stamp of creating an report in customer interface database and last 
handling time are delivered to the analysis tool. 
3.3.2 Change Requirements: MTBF 
Customer 
x No need for changes in the data base.  
x However, current process of reopening closed reports does not meet RCM 
requirements. Thus if incidence report has already been opened and closed for 
the product, new incidence report should be opened instead of reopening old 
one.
customer interface 
x In order to fully meet the MTBF calculation requirements, the database should 
have possibility to derive SW sub module release versions and times from 
device SW version information.  
x If MTBF data on the report would include also split between upstream and 
downstream times, fix availability time and fix verification time, those should 
have own separate item in the incidence report.  
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x Automatic calculation of processing time, time to fix availability and time to 
verify would ease MTBF-calculation, when those are sent to analysis tool. Fix 
availability time stamp can be implemented as manual entry by customer 
interface team. 
3.4 FMEA 
3.4.1 Current state: FMEA 
Customer 
x This has not been implemented at all. 
customer interface 
x This has not been implemented at all. 
3.4.2 Change Requirements: FMEA 
Customer 
x No need for changes, FMEA analysis is done by customer interface. 
customer interface 
x Full range of RCM related items should be implemented to the incidence report. 
These items would include:  
o Failure (most commonly: test case not passed) 
o Failure mode (multiple level, of which last one free from text field) 
o Unique failure mode ID creation in RCM style 
o Failure effect analysis (Hidden, Safety, Operational, Economic) => 
Effect type 
x All of items mentioned above should be transferrable to analysis tool. These 
items may be changed in the analysis tool and modified values should be able to 
be sent back to the customer interface system. 
x Analysis tool itself should have templates for statistical analysis. The extracted 
incidence data should be easy to be filtered to separate analyses according to for 
example incidence report priority or root cause.  
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3.5 Task 
3.5.1 Current state: Task 
Customer 
x This has not been implemented at all. 
customer interface 
x customer interface group can communicate the task via comment field. 
3.5.2 Change Requirements: Task 
Customer 
x No need for changes, RCM analysis is done by customer interface. 
customer interface 
x The following entry fields should be amended to the incidence report: 
o Task type (Communication, Configuration, Test Case Redesign, 
Integration, Product Redesign). 
o Link to maintenance task and task ID Current system would allow short 
description and link implementation within incidence report in a 
convenient way. This may be quite an easy to implement automatically, 
as the current data base system supports it. 
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4 mySQL commands for creating RCM compliant 
database
This chapter describes one way of creating a database that meets minimum 
requirements to create a database to handle RCM style incidence reports in SW 
development environment. As I have some knowledge about SQL, mySQL style 
definition is used to define the data base structure in this chapter. 
The presented split between report, sw, test_case and fix tables is optimized for 
minimizing duplicate data in this relation database. Some of needed interdependencies 
between these tables are described later. In addition to these tables, reference tables for 
failures and failure modes may be needed. Those will contain plaintext information 
about the failure/mode corresponding to certain ID. 
The functionality for the tables can be done in web interface using for example PERL or 
PHP scripting language. Implementation of that is out of scope of this graduation thesis 
and can be considered as one of best further development item for this graduation 
thesis. These tables are to be considered as starting point for specifying implementation 
specific RCM compliant data structures, only. 
4.1 Creating database 
CREATE msg3
4.2 Creating tables 
The active database has to be selected with  
USE msg3
Figure 11 shows, how to create incidence report table. Root_cause_id is needed for 
statistical analysis purposes described in Chapter 5.2. In this case additional table for 
failure modes (e.g. modes) should be created and it should include plain text 
information about the global list of failure modes in three separate levels. Maintenance 
tasks are in separate table. 
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CREATE TABLE report ( 
   report_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT UNIQUE, 
   product VARCHAR(20),   
   prod_sw VARCHAR(20),   
   created DATE,  
   test_case VARCHAR(20), 
   test_area VARCHAR(20), 
   sw_module VARCHAR(10),  
   fix_date DATE, 
   fix_duration INT, 
   fix_id VARCHAR(25),   
   verification_date DATE,  
   failure_id VARCHAR(40),  
   mode1_id SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
   mode2_id CHAR(1), 
   mode3_id SMALLINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, 
   root_cause_id VARCHAR(10), 
   hidden SMALLINT(1), 
   safety SMALLINT(1) , 
   operational SMALLINT(1), 
   economical SMALLINT(1), 
   task_type VARCHAR(10)); 
Incidence report id 
Product under test 
Product SW 
Incidence report creation 
date 
Failure 
Test case group 
SW sub module (from FMEA) 
Fix date  
Fix duration (DT\\product) 
Fix ID (MSI ID) 
Fix verification date 
Failure ID 
Level 1 MSG-3 type Mode ID 
Level 2 MSG-3 type Mode ID 
Level 3 MSG-3 type Mode ID 
Level 1..3 type Mode ID 
Effect hidden?  
Effect safety? 
Effect operational? 
Effect economical? 
E.g. communication, 
component upgrade, redesign 
Figure 11: Report table 
Product SW version reference table (sw) is needed if SW sub module level MTBF 
calculations are planned to be done. In theoretical example in Figure each product SW 
contains two main SW modules. For MTBF calculations sw each table entry has to 
define also creation date for each SW sub module that is included to corresponding 
product SW. Theoretical structure for such sw table is described below. 
CREATE TABLE sw ( 
product VARCHAR(20), 
sw_ver VARCHAR(20), 
sw_date DATE,  
sub_SW_1 VARCHAR(20), 
sub_SW_1ver VARCHAR(10), 
sub_SW_1date DATE,     
sub_SW_2 VARCHAR(20), 
sub_SW_2ver VARCHAR(10), 
sub_SW_2date DATE); 
Product 
Product SW version 
Product SW creation date 
SW sub module 1 (plaintext) 
SW sub module 1 version in the product 
SW sub module 1 version creation date  
SW sub module 2 (plaintext) 
SW sub module 2 version in the product 
SW sub module 2 version creation date 
Figure 12: SW table 
Separate table for test cases is created with following way (where test_case.id equals
report.test_case). test_case.url is plain text field corresponding to web address 
containing details about that test case. 
CREATE TABLE test_case ( 
id VARCHAR(20), 
title VARCHAR(40), 
url VARCHAR(255)); 
32 (43) 
Separate table for maintenance tasks (where fix.id equals report.task).
test_case.url is plain text field corresponding to web address containing details 
about that maintenance task. 
CREATE TABLE fix ( 
id VARCHAR(20), 
category VARCHAR(40), 
url VARCHAR(255)); 
In this chapter both test_case and fix descriptions are behind URL in order to give 
flexibility on the way the test case or maintenance task is described. The URL can point 
to actual test case execution web page or other web page, word processing document, 
spread sheet document or an external database containing the test case description. 
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5 Recommendations of statistical analyses to use for 
incidence report data 
5.1 Pareto analysis 
Pareto Diagram gives information, how root causes will contribute to over all incidence 
report amount. As the different products, SW sub modules and platform SW generations 
will have different amount of issues, scaling to 100% maximum instead of absolute 
numerical value gives more comparable value across those. Therefore 100% scaled x-
axis and y-axis is better, than using the absolute values. 
Pareto  Diagram 1
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0% 100.0%
Figure 13: Pareto Diagram of test results. 
In Figure 13 green line describes relative amount of incidence reports caused by a single 
identified root cause. The root cause hit data is sorted from greatest hit number to 
lowest. Red line indicates cumulative number for the same data. With this statistical 
tool it is possible to estimate effectiveness of RCM process. From the Pareto diagram, 
following formula can be created:  
1%)100,(
%
%
%%   ¦ x
yyxP
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In Figure 13 this reference value is: 
57,11
%28
%72%)100,( %%    ¦ yxP
This indicates that significant benefits can be achieved easily with RCM process.  
When creating the Pareto Diagram, the root causes are also sorted to descending order 
by hit number of the root cause. That ordered list can be considered as initial priority 
handling list for the customer incidence reports. 
5.2 MTBF  
For Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) calculations to any system it is crucial to 
understand, when the system has a fail and when that fail is considered to be fixed in the 
evaluation context. This chapter focuses on how to calculate MTBF related data for 
customer incidence reports in different contexts. 
Time Between Failures (TBF) should be calculated to all root causes (instead of test 
cases) at least per product SW. As described in chapter 3.3 each new failure should 
have new incidence report in order to get proper MTBF calculation. MTBF for a root 
cause is a mean value of all TBF:s for that root cause in that product. Thus n  in next 
formula is determined by the amount of incidence reports for that product with the same 
root cause. 
¦
 
 
n
i
i
n
TBFMTBF
1
In order to measure TBF times, each customer incidence report has to have field for 
creation date and also for the time, customer reports the problem solved. Now, if the 
same root cause has new incidence report a TBF can be defined. 
Figure 14 describes basic principle how to calculate MTBF for customer incidence 
reports. In the figure below root cause is the same for both incidence reports. The test 
case may be the same for both incidence reports, but can also be different. The fix task 
should be different for these two incidence reports, as the root cause is same and there 
was working component fix earlier for that root cause.  
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Figure 14: TBF calculation principle. 
Down Time (DT) can be split to two components, Time To Fix (TTF) and Time To 
Verify (TTV), in order to get better quality metrics for customer issue handling process. 
TTF and TTV gives the handling times for incidence report in downstream and 
upstream data flow respectively as described in Figure 10 in Chapter 3. Or time to 
analyze and implement the fix (TTF) and time to verify the fix (TTV). 
Figure 15: Down time split. 
TBF could be calculated also over a SW sub component or test area. In case of SW sub 
component case the down time (DT) time to fix (TTF) time starts from creation date of 
failing SW module. TTF calculation stops, when 1st product (any of the products) has 
the (later to be proven to work) fix; time to verify (TTV) time calculation starts at the 
same point. TTV and DT calculation stops, when the 1st product (any of the products) 
has the fix verified by customer.  
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TBF SW
Product 1
Product 2
Failing SW sub module release 
date
TTF TTV
DT SW UT SW
New failing SW sub module 
release date
UT 1
UT 2
DT 1
DT 1
Figure 16: Down time split in SW module level analysis. 
When calculating Mean Up Time (MUT) and Mean Down Time (MDT) for SW module 
or test area, the evaluation should be done for all incidence reports to that SW sub 
module or test area. Thus, if the situation is as described in Figure 14 DT 1, UT 1, DT 2, 
DT 2 should be used instead of DT SW and UT SW.  
DT SW and UT SW are valid for single SW sub module generation only. These can be 
used along with alarm limits to improve fixing speed in active program development 
time or for later analysis purposes to pinpoint possible problem areas in that context. 
MTBF for a SW module should be calculated from all TBF SW values over time. Thus 
the split between products is not implemented for this calculation. 
5.2.1 Example for MTBF calculation for a SW module 
In end of year (31.12.2008) customer interface group has to make a yearly report 
including MTBF calculations. Let’s assume that for a SW module we have detected a 
single root cause for all incidence reports reported to it and there is three incidence 
reports reported for it. 
Incidence reports 1 and 2 are reported to a SW module version (v1.0) created 
22.04.2008 and report 3 is reported for SW module version (v2.0) created 17.06.2008. 
These dates are also down time start dates for mentioned versions of the SW module. 
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Report 1 and 2 are created 09.05.2008 and Report 3 19.06.2008. 
Report 1, report 2 and report 3 have been fixed respectively in 14.05.2008, 19.05.2008 
and 21.09.2008. Verification dates for the reports are respectively 28.05.2008, 
23.05.2008 and 21.09.2008. 
31.12.08
SW DT SW DT # Fixed Verified
R1 22.4.08 22.4.08 9.5.08 14.5.08 28.5.08
R2 22.4.08 22.4.08 9.5.08 19.5.08 23.5.08
R3 17.6.08 17.6.08 19.6.08 21.9.08 21.9.08
TBF SW
R1
DT SW UT SW
UT 1DT 1
R2
R3
UT 2DT 2
DT SW, DT 3
31
.1
2.
20
08
21
.0
9.
20
09
17
.0
6.
20
09
22
.0
4.
20
08
UT SW, UT 3
TBF SW
96 days 100 days
23
.0
5.
20
08
32 days 24 days
Figure 17: MTBF for a SW module 
From Figure 17 it can be seen, that first verification for SW module version 1.0 is 
23.05.2008 – or 32 days after creation date of that. As next SW module version to have 
an incidence report is version 2.0 that is created in 17.06.2008: 
x DT for version 1.0 is 32 days 
x UT for version 1.0 is 24 days 
x TBF for version 1.0 is 56 days 
Report 3 has been reported for SW module version 2.0 and no further reports have done 
for this SW module. Therefore: 
x Reporting date (31.12.2008) will be used as TBF end date for version 2.0, thus 
TBF for version 2.0 is 196 days 
x DT for version 2.0 is 96 days 
x UT for version 2.0 is 100 days 
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Therefore MTBF for this SW module is: 
daysdays
n
TBFMTBF
n
i
i 126
2
)19656(
1
   ¦
 
From previous it can be seen, that MTBF is constantly living value that is depended on 
the reporting date. It can also be calculated that in customer perspective up time ratio 
(%)UT  for this SW module in end of year 2008 would be: 
%2,49
)19656(
)10024((%)
1
 


  ¦
 days
days
TBF
UT
UT
n
i i
i
5.2.2 Comparable MTBF related values 
Different DT results may have different maximum allowed processing time, but the 
results should be comparable between each others. In this case, if comparable results 
should be created, each product or SW module should have maximum Allowed 
Handling Time (AHT) defined for it. The comparable DT (cDT) value will be defined 
by following formula: 
AHT
DTcDT  
The same principle can be used for UTs and TBFs, also. Thus following formulas could 
be used for calculating comparable values for those: 
AHT
TBFcTBF
AHT
DUcUT
 
 
These comparable values can be used to create uniform metric to all products, SW 
layers or applications. 
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6 Findings 
The basis of this thesis was to comprehend SW as functional module, that can live 
during time. Thus SW modules can also wear out, albeit abruptly (versus mechanical 
wearing). Therefore MTBF is possible to be calculated. Indication of such failure is a 
customer incidence report.  Every new version platform SW, application or sub module 
is possible cause of new error. It is task of FMEA analysis to define, if the new report is 
created for new or already known root cause. 
In this thesis RCM process is implemented in such way, that SW MTBF is possible to 
measure in sub module level and also over platform SW releases at the same time and in 
the way that the statistic run for different applications, SW modules or products is 
comparable. That is totally new approach in this field. Because in SW development 
environment the test cases are tightly bind to functions, MTBF is possible to be 
calculated in test case super group level, but usually not in test case level. 
When a customer incidence report is received it is already known, that customer 
interface team has to react at least with communication (failure effect) to the customer 
direction and the consequence of the incidence report is at least economical. However, 
during FMEA analysis both consequence and effect may be upgraded. 
Down time split to Time To Fix and Time To Verify enables to gather statistics where 
the bottlenecks of fix roll out are; is the bottle neck in implementation or verification 
phase. If this statistics is gathered, also sorting according those is automatically 
possible. 
Current data base system does not need big changes, if RCM approach will be taken 
into usage in customer interface. Most of the changes can be managed by adding 
supporting fields not currently present in the data base and adding those to the list of 
fields to be exported to the external data analysis tool. The bigger modification 
requirements are imposed to the analysis tools, than data base structure itself. 
Hidden or safety category incidence reports were not found in the analysis done to real 
data after this thesis. Hidden incidence reports can exist only for internal testing results, 
as customer will be always aware of the results of its own testing. In that sense Hidden 
Safety and Hidden Economical MSI categories are not valid for direct customer 
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feedback. Detectable Safety category incidence reports do not exist, if the incidence 
reports to be analyzed are focused to an application that is not related to safety related 
functions of the device – and no interference with safety functions is to be found during 
the FMEA analysis. 
Combined history of RCM and MSG is not gathered together as completely in any 
document as in this thesis. 
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7 Benefits of implementation 
FMEA analysis increases customer understanding. I found out, that my customer 
understanding improved even I have been working on this position already for four 
years. That is achieved, because after FMEA analysis it can determined, which test 
cases are failing for which root cause – or is a test case failing because of multitude of 
root causes. 
Quality of maintenance tasks will be greatly increased, when FMEA is run to the 
customer reports. From FMEA analysis it is possible to define MSIs and maintenance 
task list for root causes. After FMEA the task list can be ordered according root cause 
impact in stead of failing test case impact. Proper root cause analysis can also reveal 
initial wrong verdict for customer incidence reports. 
Benefit from the RCM style maintenance task list is, that customer satisfaction will be 
increased. Communication package (maintenance task list) is good tool to pinpoint most 
critical improvement areas to R&D and to the customer. After delivering it every one 
involved in the process knows, why some test case is not passing and what would be 
benefits or effort to fix it. The root causes can be sorted not only by failure
consequences or failure effects, but also according the amount of incidence reports the 
root causes are contributing giving better organized priority listing than using only one 
of those attributes for prioritizing. Customer or customer interface can more effectively 
prioritize a redesign requests for a root cause instead of failing test case, when 
maintenance task list is properly organized.  
Implementing RCM style fields and functions to the incidence report handling database 
would enable collecting of new statistical data that would show customer view on SW 
in numerical format. Also the silent information collected by different customer 
interface group members would become easily handled public domain as anyone could 
refer to data base reports containing maintenance tasks when making analysis of new 
incidence report. By using data base, the data would also be coherent in all extracted 
reports compared to spreadsheet / word processor approach used in the first analysis 
that was done using this thesis as guide line. 
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8 Further development 
This thesis is a good base to implement real functional relation data base for RCM 
compliant data base for SW development purposes. Improving the statistical tools and 
reporting functions to an existing or new data base system would be also good 
development item. Adding the web frontend as data base UI for the data base backed 
with server side scripting language, such as PERL, Ajax or PHP should be considered. 
In Nokia extending RCM analysis to other applications is one important development 
activity. Also training material for RCM should be created, if RCM will be adopted in 
Nokia Devices. Naturally this kind of activities can be good themes for a B.Sc. thesis 
work even thesis is not commissioned by Nokia. 
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APPENDIX II: Customer communications packet template 
CTA Customer Communications 
Packet for Customer: 
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1. Introduction 
This report is based on FMEA analysis results for Application issue reports. FMEA analysis has 
been made for all issues reported to all Nokia products reported until 31st Jun 2008.  
(5/10) 
2. Actions 
2.1 Functional changes in version 2.0 
Following functional changes are implemented to version 2.0 of Application, which is rolled out to 
Nokia devices starting from Q2/09: 
x Change 1 
x Change 2 
x … 
2.1.1 Version 2.0 roll-out plan 
Product The first Product SW release to have Application 
v2.0 
Product 1 3.0 
Product 2 2.1 
Product 3 1.4 
…
(6/10) 
2.2 Communication tasks 
2.2.1 WMA 192 kHz 
Failure reason: WMA 192 kHz is not supported 
Area: Data conversion 
Failure ID: 5B4A 
Consequence: Detectable Economical 
Occurrence: 1 
Task category: Communication 
x Our devices do not support WMA 192 kHz sample rate 
Issues reported: 5 
Test Cases affected: 5.7.15 
(7/10) 
2.3 Configuration tasks 
2.3.1 Parser configuration 
Failure reason: Server parser configuration error 
Area: Dial up 
Failure ID: 4A1A 
Consequence: Detectable Operational 
Occurrence: 1 
Task category: Configuration 
x Server parser function had configuration error that was corrected by replacing lines 15 
to 20 with following code: 
Task category: Communication 
x Inform customer, that this was server related error that has been fixed. 
Issues reported: 1 
Test Cases affected: 1.1.18 
(8/10) 
2.4 Test case redesign tasks 
2.4.1 Test Case 5.7.12 code error 
Failure reason: Test case 5.7.12 line 10 
Area: Data conversion 
Failure ID: 4B1A 
Consequence: Detectable Operational 
Occurrence: 1 
Task category: Test case redesign 
x Test case 5.7.12 line 10 has to be replaced with following code: 
Task category: Communication 
x Inform customer, that this test case had error in line 10 and it has been fixed now. 
Issues reported: 4 
Test Cases affected: 5.7.12 
(9/10) 
2.5 Integration tasks 
2.5.1 Implementation of this feature was not done 
Failure reason: Integration of this feature is coming to product SW 1.2 
Area: Dial up 
Failure ID: 4D5A 
Consequence: Detectable Operational 
Occurrence: 1 
Task category: Integration 
x Verify, that the inmtegration of this feature is working on SW 1.2 
Task category: Communication 
x Infrom customer, that this feature will be implemented in SW 1.2 
Issues reported: 18 
Test Cases affected: 1.2.30 
(10/10) 
2.6 Redesign tasks 
2.6.1 Connection re-establishment after voice call 
Failure reason: Connection re-establishment after voice call, metod not supported 
Area: Dial up 
Failure ID: 5E4A 
Consequence: Detectable Operational 
Occurrence: 1 
Task category: Redesign 
x Change request had been already created. Redesign ID: 11523-08. Followup the 
redesign process. 
Task category: Communication 
x Inform customer, that this optional call method in the specification is not currently 
supported by our device, but it will be supported during this year. Detailled roll out plan 
will be informed later. 
Issues reported: 25 
Test Cases affected: 1.15.23 
